



C
O
P
Y

~~SECRET~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

NLE MR Case No. 99-167
Document No. 4

The Honorable Neil H. McElroy
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.



Dear Neil:

When I had the privilege of speaking to the Quantico meeting last June, I emphasized my view of the growing importance of the Military Attache system in the over-all intelligence structure. Events which have transpired since then have reinforced this view.

In the troubled world of today, military men are emerging more and more in the key roles controlling the destinies of many countries. This is especially true in Egypt and Iraq in the Middle East, in Thailand and Indonesia in the Far East, and in Cuba and Venezuela in Latin America. France is another example. I could name many others.

It is of the greatest importance that we establish close relations with the military regimes in power, with those officers who may achieve power in the near future, and with the younger officers who will come into increasingly important positions as their careers progress. This can best be accomplished by developing these vital contacts through our Military Attache system and through the MAAG groups and military missions.

In recent years I feel that great strides have been made toward improving the Military Attache system so far as the training and caliber of our representatives are concerned. In many cases the reporting of the Military Attaches has been outstanding and of key importance in our over-all intelligence effort. However, I have certain suggestions as to how we can further strengthen this vital arm of our intelligence system.

~~SECRET~~

C
O
P
Y

First, I believe that in a number of countries our attache offices are inadequately staffed. There are several countries where we have no military representation whatsoever. And there are still other countries with no resident attache, where the attache is assigned to another country with possibly conflicting interests. The Sudan is an example of the last point. Also, a concerted effort should be made to dispel the false impression that the Military Attache is only a social asset to the Embassy. There is vital intelligence in many areas of the world today that can best be collected by the Military Attache, particularly if he has the linguistic ability and has developed good contacts in the services.

Second, we should emphasize the necessity of accurate and detailed reporting on the attitudes and planning of the military services and individual members thereof, in the many countries where the military hold the key to power. While it is of course recognized that the military missions and MAAGS are not in the intelligence business, their close, and sometimes unique, contact with the host country military personnel can be of tremendous value. For example, our over-all analysis of the situation in Iraq might have been far more accurate had all our military representatives there in their daily contacts with Iraqi army personnel been on the alert to look for and report to the attaches signs indicative of the basis, timing and organization of a coup. I believe that these MAAG and military mission officers should have intelligence briefings before they depart for their posts, and should be instructed to report matters of intelligence interest that they may obtain incident to their work.



C
O
P
Y

I would appreciate your consideration of these points,
and shall be glad to give any possible support to measures to
help carry out these recommendations.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature

Allen W. Dulles
Director

